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“Pensée sans images” (Imageless thought) and “Images de pensée” (Thought-Images): 
Jean-Paul Sartre, reader of Karl Bühler and Auguste Flach 
 
The edition of the graduation thesis that Sartre presented in 1927 invites us to plunge back into 
the documentary sources of the psychology of the time for which, in the wake of Bergson and with 
the arrival of psychoanalysis in France, the problem of symbolic thought had become crucial. In 
L’Image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature (The Image in the Psychological Life: Role and Nature), the 
young Sartre develops a first theory of imagination that fits in an original way into the debate on 
“pure thought”. The matrix of Sartre’s psychology of imagination will be presented through his 
criticism of the work of the Würzburg School and the investment of the experimental research of 
Auguste Flach, a Karl Bühler’s pupil in Vienna. From the philosophical psychology of the thesis 
to the phenomenological psychology of The Imagination (1936) and The Imaginary (1940), we will 




From “Thought-Images” to “image-based understanding” 
 
Under what material conditions did the Diploma reach us? First of all, it should be pointed out 
that the autograph manuscript of the dissertation has not been located. The document in our 
possession is a typewritten reproduction dating from the 1970s. We know from Michel Contat that 
Michel Rybalka is at the origin of this copy.  
 
It is on the basis of this typing of 277 leaves that we published the Diplôme in Études sartriennes. It 
provides a well-preserved text to be read as a whole. On the menu are five chapters of unequal size 
and a brief conclusion, framed by an index of references cited and by an appendix of later fragments 
found with the manuscript. The absence of the first 4 pages of the manuscript at the time of 
transcription is noted. The same applies to some local interventions which seemed to be by the 
hand of Professor de Sartre, Henri Delacroix. 
 
In this sense, from the point of view of the chronology of Sartre’s early works, the pages of the 
Diplôme show an early interest in the theme of imagination. They certainly lack the 
phenomenological method that would support the original thesis that would be presented in 
L’Imaginaire, in 1940, a thesis according to which the image is a consciousness that aims at an object 
as being absent and unreal. 
 
The fact remains that, from the point of view of the intertwined history of psychology and 
philosophy in France, Sartre’s research in 1927, while falling within the particular theoretical field 
of philosophical psychology, of which Henri Delacroix was one of the main leaders during the 
inter-war period, is indeed an embryonic but decisive formulation of the future conception of the 
imagination.  
 
As the title of the dissertation indicates, Sartre’s main preoccupation in his research was with the 
mental image. As will be the case in the phenomenological psychology of the imagination, it is already 
the refusal to consider the image as a weakened perception that motivates an investigation into the true 
 2 
role and nature of the image. By taking up these two classic questions of psychology, Sartre 
therefore intends to provide a reformist point of view on the imagination. 
 
From the first chapter, he endeavours, on the one hand, to extract the notion of image from the 
classical explanations of perceptive activity and, on the other hand, to make the relationship 
between image and perception more complex by proposing the notion of “superperceptions” 
(surperception) of Proustian inspiration.  
Chapter II - which is also the longest chapter of the dissertation - aims to clarify the relationship 
between image and thought, notably through a historical-critical approach that allows Sartre to 
position himself in an important debate with the theorists of the Imageless Thought. Taking the 
opposite view to their affirmation of pure thought, Sartre defends, on his own behalf, the idea that 
thought is fundamentally imaging and that there are, in short, only “Thought- images”.  
This leads him to draw up, in his third chapter, a typology of “attitudes towards the image” based 
on the four major psychological types: the mystic, the scientist, the artist and the schizoid.  
Considering that the normal attitude towards the image consists of a hybridisation of these four 
major tendencies, Sartre devotes his fourth chapter to determining the origin of images with the 
help of the notion of “personality”. In doing so, he draws on data from the psychopathology of 
his time, in discussion with psychoanalysis in particular, in order to highlight a reciprocal influence 
link between bodily attitudes and mental images.  
Finally, the fifth and last chapter tackles the problem of the specific nature of the image by 
starting from a critique of existing theories in order to investigate the thesis of a creative 
imagination which draws its material from kinesthetics and affectivity.  
In Conclusion, Sartre recalls the psychological framework of his analyses, which are defined 
between the two theoretical limits of perception and the Mind, and he reaffirms his conception of 
imagination: for him, it is the entire thought, at the junction of the corporeal and the spiritual, 
which is imaginative, at different degrees of schematisation and symbolisation. It is from this 
tendency of the mind to create for itself a lining of things and to believe in their existence that the 
inner life was born and developed. 
 
This overview of the major articulations of the Diplome obviously does not take into account the 
abundance of theoretical sources used by the young Sartre, from the scientific psychology of Henri 
Pieron to the rationalist analyses of Alain, passing through the genetic psychology of Piaget or even 
through works, now forgotten, such as the bibliological psychology of Roubakine. It should be 
noted, however, that the theoretical material gathered in 1927 will play the role of a veritable reserve 
for the works published in 1936 and 1940, especially as regards the use of experimental data 
collected from the various authors and in personal observations. 
 
From 1927 onwards, Sartre identified the major solutions to the problem of the image, whose 
criticism would form the nerve of L’imagination in 1936. A historical table thus presents the great 
lineages of Cartesian dualism of thought and image, the Aristotelian and Leibnizian theory of the 
image as a support for thought, associationism and, finally, the romantic theories which 
Imagination will pay little attention to because of their ephemeral nature. 
 
 
By the time Sartre wrote his thesis, associationism, of which Hippolyte Taine was the great French 
representative, had already come under attack from James and Bergson, and it was to the 
Denkpsychologie and the Würzburg school that French psychologists turned. For Sartre, the theorists 
of Würzburg extend the Cartesian dualism of thought and image by asserting that there is a pure 
thought whose processes take place without the mediation of images. Through his 
uncompromising criticism, Sartre clearly takes his place in a debate with German psychology, which 
is one of the historical markers of French philosophical psychology.  
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In this sense, we owe it to Delacroix and his students - in particular Albert Spaier, Albert Burloud 
and Ignace Meyerson - for having produced the first critical syntheses of the work of the Würzburg 
school and its method of experimental introspection. Sartre clearly fits into this psycho-
philosophical constellation by dissecting the protocols and minutes published in the Archiv für die 
gesamte Psychologie. He was thus the first to take an interest in a 1925 article by Auguste Flach, whose 
“discovery” of symbolic schemes he exploited to the full. But it is also on the basis of this discovery 
that the young psychologist distances himself from the views of his research director.  
 
In fact, Delacroix’s general psychology proposes a theory of the symbolic with an intellectualist 
and idealistic orientation. In Le langage et la pensée (1924), Delacroix gives the image the dignity of 
being a “spiritual instrument” by placing symbolic thought at the foundation of all intellectual 
operations and all relations with the world. This conception of the symbolic is based on the desire 
to highlight the purely operative work of the mind, through its capacity to establish ideal 
relationships between things. In this sense, Delacroix turns away from the intuitionism and realism 
of his former master Bergson. In favouring the latter’s analyses of “Intellectual effort” and his 
conception of the “dynamic scheme”, Delacroix takes the direction of a philosophy of the mind 
based on a schematism of intelligence. 
 
Against this intellectualism, Sartre seeks to conceive a true symbolic imagination that integrates the 
so-called superior operations of the mind. To this end, he crucially mobilises an article by Émile 
Bréhier, which deals with a problem on the borderline between the symbolic and the mystical, that 
of allegorical thought. In this 1908 article, Bréhier described the perpetual and deceptive movement 
of thought, moving from image to idea without ever reaching its goal. For Sartre, one must 
recognise in these descriptions the symbolic function of the image which is at the foundation of 
spiritual life and whose “continual failure” is, in truth, the mark of the singular dynamism of 
thought. Formulated in a positive way, this dynamism is that of an infinite envelopment of thought 
which never ceases to surpass itself through its effort to understand.  
Here Sartre agrees with Delacroix’s analyses concerning the act of understanding, but he rejects 
the tendency which amounted to devaluing the image by placing it under the distant authority of 
intelligence, and at the same time depriving it of its own symbolic function. In a closeness to the 
theories that he described as “romantic”, the young Sartre conceived imagination rather in its co-
extension with thought. 
He thus aims to account for the continuous “spontaneous gush” of images in psychological life by 
formulating a theory of enveloping and enveloped images. Wrap-around images are nothing less than 
the fundamental expression of thought in all its modalities - including the most abstract modalities 
such as those of the mathematician's ideas. This principle of animating thought in enveloping 
images is duplicated through the enveloped images which, for their part, constitute the scenario of 
a thought letting itself be carried away by its need for persuasion. 
 
To clarify this point, Sartre draws from self-observation a very telling example of the wrapped 
image: he explains how, in order to convince himself of the validity of a certain political theory, a 
spring image had appeared to him to provide evidence for the idea that “a nation that is oppressed 
gains strength from being oppressed” (L’image, p. 143). Through this distinction between the 
enveloping and the enveloped, Sartre for the first time dismantled a mechanism of duplicity and 
self-deception, at the heart of imaginative spontaneity as belief and an attempt at self-persuasion.  
 
Such analyses show the extent to which the psychology of 1927 plays an essential genetic role in 
the constitution of the Sartrean model of an intentional consciousness burdened by bad faith, as 
established by L’être et le néant (Being and Nothingness) in 1943. 
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More locally, such a genetic role can be observed in the development of the phenomenological 
concept of degradation. Speaking of the “fall of potential” that the enveloping image makes the 
enveloping image “undergo”, Sartre describes in 1927 a psychic phenomenon that presents the 
seeds of what, in L’imaginaire, will be called “the degradation of knowledge in image”. Now, the 
theoretical function of this notion of “degradation” will be precisely to counter the Husserl notion 
of Erfüllung (filling), which Sartre reproaches for yielding again to the “illusion of immanence”. 
Here we see how old analyses contribute to Sartre’s singular appropriation of phenomenology. 
 
Moreover, after his time in Berlin, Sartre is no longer so clear-cut with regard to the psychologists 
in Würzburg, to whom he finally concedes the existence of pure knowledge and the possibility of 
pure understanding alongside, respectively, imaging knowledge and imaged understanding. He thus 
abandoned his romantic and ultra-symbolist position, which was that the entire life of thought 
should be developed in images. In 1940, it was no longer a question of “diluting the imagination 
in the whole of psychic life” (L’imaginaire, p. 183), but rather of determining the sui generis being 
of the image and recognising imagination as an essential function of consciousness. 
 
This being the case, Sartre remains faithful to his youthful intuition by defining the symbolism of 
the image by the fact that the latter “is like an incarnation of unthinking thought” (p. 216). The 
analysis of imaged understanding is then based on a definition that L’imaginaire (p. 223) takes up 
literally in the Diplôme (p. 164): “Understanding is a movement that never ends, it is the reaction of 
the mind to an image by another image, to this one by another image and so on, in law, to infinity.”  
 
This time, the phenomenologist no longer has to bother with the discussion with the former 
professor Henri Delacroix, but he does find the essential “mechanism” - the word comes back 
surprisingly in 1940 (p. 205) - the mechanism, therefore, of image-based understanding. It is on 
this mechanism that both the risk of a certain complacency with images and the happiness of 
invention and creation rest. It is through this mechanism, finally, that Sartre apprehends, in 
L’Imaginaire, the magical sense of the imagination which is, he explains, “an incantation”, a desire 
for possession. 
 
2. Thought-images As a new paradigm 
 
Against thinking without images, Sartre developed a new paradigm, that of “Tought-Images”. 
Having unearthed an article by Auguste Flach entitled “Über symbolische schemata im 
Denkprozess” (About symbolic schemes in the thought process) in the Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie of 
1925, which had not yet been exploited by French psychology, the young philosopher could 
support the idea that thought is fundamentally expressed by a phenomenon of symbolisation. 
Sartre mobilises Flach, emphasising the great interest in “determining exactly the proper role, 
movement and conditions of appearance of [the] images”. He thus seizes upon what he presents 
as a “true psychological discovery” through a critical account in two stages. First, the positive 
contributions of the notion of symbolic schema are presented through a summary (about ten pages 
long) which extracts and translates the most significant passages of the article. Then, the discussion 
of a series of elements that are unsatisfactory from Sartre’s point of view feeds the enunciation of 
his own ideas. In doing so, Sartre radicalises the notion of symbolic scheme by extending his field of 
action to the various forms of image described by Flach, namely the Denkillustrierungen and the 
diagrams and synesthetics, to which the autoscopic images are added. Moreover, he shows that the 
appearance of these images has, in each case, been linked to bodily, kinesthetic and emotional 
attitudes so that these images say something about the personality that produces them. With the 
study of these phenomena of symbolisation, Sartre indicates a path of work that should be 
exploited in the sense of psychoanalysis. 
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 “The remarkable and too little known work of Flach on symbolic schemas in the process f ideation”, as it 
is still presented in L'Imaginaire, was a real thread in the development of image theory in 1927, and 
constituted a propaedeutic to Sartre’s conception of imagination, even after Husserl’s meeting. 
Indeed, on the one hand, they lead the young Sartre to perceive the intrinsic link between images 
and consciousness, and, on the other hand, they initiate the phenomenological understanding of 
the image through a fruitful dialogue with Henri Delacroix, a dialogue whose development can be 
found in L'Imaginaire: the symbolic scheme would be the “constitution of an object”, an “attempt 
to use intuition” to “give oneself the presence” of an “absent” object. The schema is subject to the 
phenomenon of “quasi-observation” and it would be to succumb to the “illusion of immanence” 
to believe, like Flach, that the subject reads the meaning on the schema. The operator of these 
analyses of symbolic schemas is the conception of comprehension that comes, as we have seen, 
from the psychology of Delacroix (which Sartre takes up again in 1940, without specifying it): 
 
 “Comprehension is a movement that never ends, it is the reaction of the mind to one image by 
another image, to this one by another image and so on, in law, to infinity”. 
 
Thus, Flach’s criticism leads to the conception of “true symbolism”, i.e. a symbolism that does not 
conceive of the symbolic scheme as a “grimoire” on which thought comes to read the meaning.  
 
Finally, beyond the technical discussion of the psychology of thought, Flach’s article seems to give 
Sartre a more unexpected inspiration, in the direction of the realistic profession of faith which is 
at the origin of his philosophical and literary project: it is the idea that a city - Flach speaks of 
Genoa - holds “a special character, a personality” that intuition can grasp through a symbolic 
scheme. Sartre, for his part, never ceased to seek to capture the essence of the cities he visited - 
London, Naples, Rome, Venice, etc. - and to make them his own. - Sartre, for his part, never 
stopped trying to grasp the essence of the cities he visited - London, Naples, Rome, Venice, etc. - 
by grasping the “adherent meaning of things”, until he found in cockfights the “synthetic scheme” 
that gave him access to the truth of Cuba. 
 
